U.S., Mexico deepen economic ties by Jesus Canas et al.
lobalization has become a
widely used term to describe
the forces knitting economies
closer together. For the United
States and Mexico, it’s just a
new word for an old phenom-
enon. The two economies—
one highly advanced, the other
still developing—have for
decades been on a path
toward ever greater integration.
The U.S. is Mexico’s top
trading partner by far. About
88 percent of Mexico’s exports
go to the U.S., and 56 percent
of its imports come from U.S.
sources. At the same time, 14
percent of U.S. exports go to
Mexico and 11 percent of
imports come across the Rio
Grande. Perhaps more impor-
tant, U.S.–Mexico trade has
grown exponentially since the
signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
growing from $89.5 billion in
1993 to $275.3 billion in 2004,
a threefold increase.
Americans are the biggest
investors in Mexico, further
evidence of NAFTA pulling the
two countries together. Since
1994, the U.S. has accounted
for 62 percent of all foreign
direct investment in Mexico. 
The two economies are also linked by
the flow of Mexican immigrants to the U.S.
and the remittances they send back home to
their families. The approximately 10 million
Mexican nationals who reside in the U.S.
sent back an estimated $20 billion in 2005,
an amount equivalent to 3 percent of
Mexico’s GDP. 
The U.S. and Mexican economies have
become increasingly synchronized. The
coincident indexes for economic activity for
both countries show that the degree of syn-
chronization since 1993 is about a third
higher than it was in 1980–93. The two
economies now march almost in lockstep.1
The facts of U.S.–Mexico economic
interaction are clear, but new questions con-
tinue to arise. How is China affecting trade
between the countries? What has been the
impact of NAFTA on Mexico’s economic
growth, specifically on regional wages? Is the
maquiladora industry tied to the U.S. busi-
ness cycle? Are remittances reducing poverty
levels in Mexico? What skills does the typical
Mexican immigrant bring to the U.S.?
In November 2005, researchers from the
U.S. and Mexico gathered in Houston to
address these issues at a Dallas Fed confer-
ence, “The U.S. and Mexico: Are We Still
Connected?” The presentations pointed to
even greater interdependence for the two
economies, a conclusion in
sync with the worldwide trend
toward increasing globalization.
U.S.–Mexico Trade
Mexico opened its econ-
omy to trade in two important
steps: joining the General
Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in 1985 and signing
NAFTA in 1994. Reducing
trade barriers represented an
epochal change in Mexican
policy, and it has brought a
sustained increase in the
inflow of foreign direct invest-
ment, made the country more
competitive and insulated it
against external shocks. 
How have two decades of
market opening impacted
Mexicans’ pay? Daniel Chiquiar,
a researcher from Banco de
México, considered the role of
trade in changing the distribu-
tion of wages in Mexico. 
Several economic geogra-
phy models have noted that
Mexico’s trade liberalization
had dramatic impacts that dif-
fered greatly by region, espe-
cially in manufacturing. The
traditional Mexico City factory
belt, located in the middle of
the country, was optimal for a closed econo-
my. After 1985, central Mexico lost at least
some of its advantage. Led by maquiladora
expansion, manufacturing employment and
wages grew sharply in the states close to the
U.S., and these gains came at the expense of
the center of the country (Chart 1).
Chiquiar entered the debate by dividing
Mexico into five regions and classifying
them according to the strength of their ties
to globalization through trade, migration
and foreign direct investment. He treats
globalization as a regionally heterogeneous
shock to Mexico’s economy, with a slowly
operating adjustment mechanism. Thus,
globalization’s effects may be felt first and
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the international economy. 
Chiquiar showed that in regions with
significant trade ties, wage inequality
declined. Other regions, less tied to trade,
saw inequality rise for reasons possibly
unrelated to trade. Chiquiar concluded that
further diminishing wage inequality will
require the rest of the country to strengthen
its linkages to the global economy. 
Forming the backbone of U.S.–Mexico
trade are programs of temporary imports to
be re-exported, which bring parts into
Mexico and return assembled products to
the U.S.2 Industrial goods make up 82 per-
cent of Mexico’s exports to the U.S. and 91
percent of imports from the U.S. According
to Enrique Dussel-Peters, economics profes-
sor at Universidad Autónoma de México,
about half of U.S.–Mexico trade is consid-
ered intra-industry trade, again mostly due
to temporary imports. Mexico’s intra-industry
trade with the U.S. achieved its highest level
in 2000 and has declined since then, while
intra-industry trade with countries such as
China is substantially lower.
These interconnections suggest the
maquiladoras are closely tied to the U.S.
industrial sector. Gustavo Félix Verduzco,
professor at Universidad Autónoma de
Coahuila, investigated the degree of synchro-
nization between the U.S. business cycle and
the maquiladoras, finding that the Mexican
plants’ production and employment are sen-
sitive to relative wages between the U.S. and
Mexico and fluctuations in the U.S. economy.
Félix Verduzco also concluded that the
economies of northern Mexico’s border
states, where the maquiladora industry is
concentrated, are more affected by U.S.
business-cycle fluctuations than the rest of
the country.
The U.S. has long been the chief trad-
ing partner for Latin America, and the rise
of China as an industrial power has posed a
new and significant threat to this relation-
ship. U.S. imports from China grew 12 per-
cent from 2000 to 2003, while U.S. imports
from Latin America grew 2.7 percent,
including 2.2 percent from Mexico. 
José Ernesto López Córdova, an econo-
mist at the Inter-American Development
Bank, conducted a study of several scenar-
ios for the sensitivity of Latin American
exports to competition from China in the
U.S. market, particularly the likely response
to changes in the prices of Chinese exports. 
López Córdova estimated that a 1 per-
cent decline in prices for Chinese exports to
the U.S. would increase U.S. imports by 3.7
percent, while Latin American exports to
the U.S. would drop 0.1 percent. The Latin
American losses are concentrated in manu-
facturing, especially leather, textiles and
apparel. 
A scenario with a 20 percent revalua-
tion of China’s currency results in Chinese
exports to the U.S. falling 22.1 percent, or
$43 billion, although overall U.S. imports
fall only 1.7 percent, or $24 billion. An
increase of 0.5 percent in Latin American
exports to the U.S. partly fills the gap. South
America gains the most, with leather, tex-
tiles and apparel again the sectors most
sensitive to price changes. 
López Córdova noted that China has
been able to compete in the U.S. despite
high tariff barriers and textile quotas, largely
due to strong productivity gains. These pro-
ductivity gains explain perhaps half of Latin
America’s U.S. export losses and reinforce
the need for regional fiscal, labor, energy
and other reforms.
Sebastián Royo, associate professor of
government at Suffolk University–Boston
and director of Suffolk University’s Madrid
campus, further discussed the need to
reform political and economic institutions to
take advantage of free trade agreements. He
compared the integration of Spain and
Portugal into the European Union (EU) with
Mexico’s integration into the rest of North
America under NAFTA. 
Spain went from 78 percent of the EU’s
average per capita GDP in 1990 to 98 per-
cent in 2004, while Portugal went from 56
percent to 73 percent over the same period.
Royo said that EU integration and Mexico’s
NAFTA experience have been similar in that
all three countries have been able to com-
pete more effectively in international markets
and confront serious economic crises at
home. Although both treaties began as eco-
nomic unions, the EU is different because it
is based in a political union built around the
principles of solidarity, which informs its dis-
tributive policies.
Both Spain and Portugal were tradition-
ally emigrant countries, but European citi-
zenship and free movement among member
countries has ended some of the past dis-
crimination against immigrants and reversed
historical patterns. Indeed, these two coun-
tries have recently become net recipients of
immigrants, perhaps offering lessons for
Mexico. 
Immigration and Remittances
For most Mexicans who emigrate to the
U.S., the attraction lies in the higher wages
north of the border. A significant number of
expatriate workers earn enough to send
money to family in Mexico, providing a
major source of income for many villages.
The money has been flowing for decades,
but the opening of Mexico’s economy over
the past dozen or so years has expanded
the ways citizens working in the U.S. can
send money home.3
Workers’ remittances now occupy sec-
ond place as a source of foreign exchange
in Mexico, behind maquiladoras and ahead
of tourism and foreign direct investment.
The remittances have risen from $84 million
in 1960 ($531 million in 2004 dollars) to
$16.6 billion in 2004, with an increase to
$20 billion estimated for 2005. Two advan-
tages of remittances, when compared with
other inflows, are that they have been stable
and countercyclical.4
Few studies analyze the impact of
remittances on developing economies, and
even fewer look specifically at the impact on
poverty levels. Gerardo Esquivel, a
researcher at Colegio de México, began with
a look at the extent of poverty in Mexico.
He used three poverty definitions: food
poverty, capabilities poverty and assets
poverty, meant to be roughly equivalent to
extreme poverty, poverty and moderate
poverty. (1) A household is considered to
be food-based poor if its net per capita
income is less than the amount of money
necessary to cover basic food expenses.
This category included 20 percent of
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hold is in capabilities poverty if its members
cannot afford to cover their basic expenses
of food, health and education. This applies
to 26.5 percent of the population. (3) A
household is in assets-based poverty if its
members cannot cover expenses of food,
health, education, clothing, home and pub-
lic transportation. About half of Mexico’s
population fits into this category.
Esquivel then considered the impact
of remittances on poverty in Mexico.5 In
2002, about 6 percent of Mexican house-
holds received money in remittances—3
percent of urban households and 10 per-
cent of rural families. Most households
receiving remittances are in central and
southern Mexico. They are not concentrat-
ed in the poorest states—such as Chiapas,
Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla and Veracruz—
because the costs of getting into the U.S.
make it difficult for someone with
extremely limited funds to migrate.
Instead, the remittances go to better-off
states such as Michoacan, Durango,
Guanajuato and Zacatecas. These four
states are home to more than one-third of
all Mexican households receiving remit-
tances.
Esquivel found that Mexico’s income
distribution is remarkably more uniform
once remittances are taken into considera-
tion (Chart 2). For example, over 45 percent
of all households that receive remittances
would fall in the bottom 10 percent of the
income distribution if the remittances were
removed. However, only 12 percent of these
households still belong to the lowest decile
if remittances are included in their income.
Esquivel analyzed the impact of remit-
tances on poverty levels through a propen-
sity score approach that matches house-
holds receiving remittances with other
households that have similar characteristics.
His findings suggest that receiving remit-
tances—regardless of the amount—reduces
the household’s probability of being in
poverty by 10 to 14 percent, depending on
the poverty measure used.
Studies differ on whether migrants to
the U.S. are drawn from the bottom or top
of Mexico’s educational distribution. The
uncertainty stems from a lack of data repre-
sentative of the entire Mexican population
and inadequate techniques to combine U.S.
and Mexican statistics.
Alfredo Cuecuecha, a professor at
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México,
studied Mexican immigrants’ educational
characteristics by using sophisticated meth-
ods to compare U.S. and Mexican census
data and adjust for the U.S. undercount of
Mexican immigrants. He concluded that for
2000 the three groups with the highest
migration probability were, in descending
order, those with nine to 12 years of educa-
tion, those with zero years of education and
those with 13 to 16 years of education
(Chart 3). 
It is not clear how to explain this non-
linear pattern because wage differentials
between the U.S. and Mexico are larger for
the least educated and decline with the level
of education. Cuecuecha cited the following
hypotheses from current research literature.
Declining migration costs for those with
more education—possibly related to greater
English proficiency among the more educat-
ed—could explain the larger migration of
individuals with medium levels of education.
Limits on access to credit may explain why
the groups with low education cannot afford
to migrate. Cuecuecha noted that individuals
in Mexico do not have access to unemploy-
ment insurance, which implies that in cases
of unemployment, they must rely on the
informal economy or their families. Because
poverty is related negatively to education,
individuals who have low levels of educa-
tion have too much to lose if they migrate
because the U.S. will not provide unemploy-
ment insurance either, and their social net-
work has stayed in Mexico.
Closely Knit Economies
The integration of the U.S. and Mexican
economies is well-established—but it is
changing in an era of increasing globaliza-
tion. Evidence of deepening ties can be
Chart 3
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found in the extent and importance of trade,
the continued growth of remittances, the
importance of the maquiladora sector in syn-
chronizing the two economies and the need
to make our economies more competitive
through sectoral and institutional reforms.
Mexico’s macroeconomic picture has
improved greatly over the past decade, but
there is room for continued gains from
reforms. According to most estimates,
Mexico’s current 3 to 4 percent GDP growth
is bumping against the ceiling of its poten-
tial rate. To improve the potential rate to 6
percent or higher, changes are needed in
Mexico’s basic institutional fabric. More
specifically, Mexico desperately needs tax,
energy and labor reforms.6
The closeness of the U.S. and Mexican
economies raises interesting issues, which
researchers are exploring in new and
insightful ways. For example, Chinese trade
with the U.S. has been based on significant
cost advantages, and it has displaced Latin
American and Mexican products from the
U.S. market. Although a more expensive
Chinese currency would help Latin America,
it may only be a short-run solution. More
than half of China’s gains over Latin
America are based on more rapidly rising
Chinese productivity. The international pro-
ductivity race reinforces the need for region-
al reforms.
Both trade and remittances have
worked to help households near the bottom
of the income ladder in Mexico. In regions
closely tied to globalization, trade has
increased the demand for unskilled labor
and raised unskilled wages relative to
skilled. In addition, remittances have pulled
a significant number of Mexican households
out of the bottom 10 percent of the income
distribution and significantly reduced the
probability that they remain in even moder-
ate poverty.
Cañas and Coronado are assistant economists at the 
El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Gilmer is a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
Notes
Conference presentations can be found on the Dallas Fed 
web site at www.dallasfed.org/news/research/2005/
05us-mexico.html.
1 From 1980 to 1993, the correlation coefficient between the
coincident indexes of economic activity in the U.S. and
Mexico was 0.73. This same measure increased to 0.96
between 1993 and 2004.
2 “U.S.–Mexico Trade: Are We Still Connected?” by Jesus
Cañas and Roberto Coronado, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas Business Frontier, Issue 3, 2004. 
3 “Workers’ Remittances to Mexico,” by Roberto Coronado,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Business Frontier, Issue 1,
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4 “Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of
External Development Finance,” by Dilip Ratha, in Global
Development Finance, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
2003.
5 “Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: A Propensity Score
Matching Approach,” by Gerardo Esquivel and Alejandra
Huerta-Pineda, Colegio de México, Working Paper, 2005. 
6 “Trade, Manufacturing Put Mexico Back on Track in 2004,”
by Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado and Robert W. Gilmer,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Houston Business, March
2005.
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